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Introduction   
Urban studies, policy and planning have long neglected telecommunications1 ; 
communications studies disciplines  have virtually ignored the city as a focus of 
research2 . It is not surprising, then, that whilst popular speculation about  what 
ʻcyberspaceʼ, the ʻinformation superhighwayʼ and ʻNational Information 
Infrastructuresʼ mean  for the future of cities is growing quickly,  these debates tend 
to be lost in a cloud of excited hyperbole and hype. So far,  most  have tended to 
generate much more heat than light3. Often, they are extremely simplistic, relying on 
assumed and unjustified assumptions about how current advances in 
telecommunications  will 'impact' on cities.  
Typical of such assumptions is the recent Economist  survey, which uncontentiously 
announced the “death of distance” due to improved telecommunications4. In this oft-
repeated scenario, plummeting communications costs, combined with  the rapid 
convergence of computing, communications and media technologies into 
“telematics”, are seen to be the “single most important economic force shaping 
                                                           
1 Mandlebaum, S.(1986), “Cities and communication: The limits of community”, 
Telecommunications Policy, June, 132-140. 
2 Jowett, G. (1993), “Urban communication: The city, media and communications 
policy”. In P. gaunt (ed), Beyond Agendas - New Directions in Communications 
Research,Westpoint: Greenwood Press, 41-56. 
3 See Burstein, D.  and Kline, D. (1995) Road Warriors: Dreams and Nightmares 
Along the Information Highway, Baltimore: Instant Impact. 
4 The Economist (1995), The Death of Distance: A Survey of Telecommunications,  
September 30th, London. 
2 
society in the first half of the next century” 5. Such technological ʻforcesʼ are widely 
seen to be directly creating some truly globalised world economy, society and 
culture. Within this, place and location will no longer matter. Soon it will be possible 
to do anything, anywhere, and at any time, as it becomes practical to access any 
information and undertake any interaction through ubiquitous, high-capacity, on-line 
links. The apparently inevitable consequence is that the large industrial city, as we 
currently know it,  must inevitable weaken its hold over the economic, social and 
cultural dynamics of capitalist society.  
But  I would argue that many such accounts of city-telecommunications relations, 
especially those which fill the media, amount  to  little more than poorly-informed 
technological forecasts. Often, these are aimed at attracting media attention or 
generating sales and glamour for technological equipment. Hugely powerful interests 
in the burgeoning, communications, computing and media industries are obviously 
set to benefit from portraying current technological changes as world-transforming 
(and, of course, world-improving ) in some simple, cause-and-effect way. The 
dominance of such hyperbole, however, has allowed a set of five myths to percolate 
into popular (and, to a surprising extent, academic) debates about  
telecommunications and the future of cities. At least,  these are dangerous 
oversimplifications ; at most,  they are little more than fabrication. In a recent book6, 
co-authored with Simon Marvin, I attempt to explore why these myths have become 
so prevalent and to systematically address each one, in the light of the latest 
theories about the complex inter-relationships between technology and society. 
The Myth of Technological Determinism 
First, there is the myth of technological determinism.  More often than not,  in the 
'mainstream' of social research on technology and cities7, new telecommunications 
technologies are seen to directly cause  urban change. This is because of their 
intrinsic qualities or 'logic' as space-transcending communications channels. The 
forces that stem from new telecommunications innovations are seen to have some 
autonomy  from  social and political processes8  - what Stephen Hill calls  "apparent 
intrinsic technological inevitability"9. Invariably,  here, modern telecommunications 
are seen as a 'shock', 'wave' or 'revolution' impacting or about to impact upon  cities.  
                                                           
5 Ibid, pp5. 
6  Graham, S. and Marvin, S, (1996)Telecommunications  and the City: Electronic 
Spaces, Urban Places, London/New York: Routledge. 
7 Mansell, R. (1994), 'Introductory overview', in  in R. Mansell (Ed) Management of 
Information and Communication Technologies. London: ASLIB. 1-7. 
8  Winner, L. (1978) Autonomous Technology:  Technics Out-of-Control as a Theme 
in Political Thought, Cambridge: MIT Press. 
9 Hill, S. (1988 ), The Tragedy of Technology, London: Pluto. 
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In these scenarios, current of future urban changes are often assumed to be 
determined  by technological changes in some simple, linear cause-and-effect 
manner.  
The use of  simple two-stage models to describe changes in cities and society is 
often a key support for such simple technological determinism. Cities are  seen to be 
placed in a new 'age' in which telecommunications increasingly have a prime role in 
reshaping their development.  Most usual here are notions that capitalism is in the 
midst of a transformation towards some 'information society' 10,  'postindustrial 
society'11, ʻinformation ageʼ, or that a more general 'communications revolution' 12  
or 'Third Wave' 13  is sweeping across  global urban society. The  broad 
'technological cause- urban impact' approach reflects very closely the 'common 
sense' view and experience  of technological change, particularly  within western 
culture.   
But such experience and such approaches are unhelpful. This is because they 
suggest that technological development is somehow separated from society, rather 
than being  designed, applied  and shaped within  specific political, social, economic 
and cultural contexts.  In fact, the effects of telecommunications are much ʻmessierʼ 
than this simple view suggests, for two reasons.  
Firstly, the design and production of telecommunications is clearly socially, 
economically and culturally biased. Large, transnational corporations are the 
dominant beneficiaries of global, state-of-the-art telematics networks. They gain 
access to optic fibre and private networks ;  people in disadvantaged ghettos are 
lucky to access a pay phone.  On the consumption front, giant media conglomerates 
are currently developing digital technologies geared toward individual use by largely-
affluent groups, for accessing charged-for services (information, teleshopping, 
telebanking).  
Second, however, this bias doesnʼt shape all technological effects in all places.  
Once technologies are available, political and social struggle and actions can 
redirect their application and change their actual effects in each case -  just as 
political and social influences can redirect the shaping of urban politics and the built 
environments  of cities.   This means that the effects of telematics in cities can 
depend heavily on how they are socially and politically constructed .  Technologies 
only have ʻeffectsʼ through the specific ways in which they become enrolled into 
                                                           
10 Lyon, D. (1988), The Political Economy of  the Information Society, Cambridge: 
Polity Press; Webster, F. (1995), Theories of the Information Society, London: 
Routledge. 
11Bell, D. (1973), The Coming of Post Industrial Society , Basic: New York. 
12Williams, F. (1983), The Communications Revolution, Sage: London. 
13Toffler, A. (1980), The Third Wave, Morrow, New York. 
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social, economic and cultural relations. For example, the computer networks 
supporting real-time financial transactions between London, New York and Tokyo 
may be technologically  very similar to the networks used by, say, global trade union 
or Non-Governmental Organisations. But the very different ways in which social 
action blends with technical support  in these cases will  allow each to have very 
different urban effects. We must  therefore acknowledge the fact that the relations 
between cities and telecommunications are complex and indeterminate and that 
there can be very different effects in different places and times. It is instructive here 
to look back at Ithiel de Sola Pool's survey of the relations between the  city and the 
telephone. He found that: 
“We find many relationships between the development of the telephone 
system and the quality of urban life; strikingly, the relationships change 
with time and with the level of telephone penetration. The same device 
at one stage contributed to the growth of the great downtowns and at a 
later stage to suburban migration. The same device, when it was scarce, 
served to accentuate the structure of differentiated neighborhoods. 
When it became a facility available to all, however, it reduced the role of 
the geographic neighborhood” 14  
 
The Myth of Urban Dissolution 
The ʻAnything-Anywhere-Anytime Dreamʼ  
 
The second myth is that cities are likely to simply dissolve, as new communications 
technologies allow urban functions to decentralise in a world where all information 
will be available at all times and places to all people.   The eventual emergence of an 
interactive, integrated and ubiquitous optic fibre network is  usually seen to be the 
technological  key  here, with its apparently limitless capacities for mediating 
entertainment, work, culture, administration, health, education,  and social 
interaction.   
As a result,  geography, propinquity and spatial dynamics  either  cease to matter at 
all  or are likely to be of much reduced significance. This  "anything, anytime, 
anywhere" dream,  and the presumption that this will mean the collapse of the 
modern city,  is central, at least implicitly,  to most  futurist visions. As Andy Gillespie 
argues, "in all [...] utopian visions, the decentralising impacts of communications 
                                                           
14 Sola Pool, I., Decker, C., Dizard, S., Israel, K., Rubin, P and Winstein, B. (1977), 
"Foresight and Hindsight: The case of the telephone". In I. Sola Pool (ed) The Social 
Impact of the Telephone, Boston; MIT Press, 127-157. 
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technology are regarded  as unproblematic and self evident" 15 .  Predictions of 
urban dissolution jostle for attention here. In Alvin Tofflerʼs influential ʻThird Waveʼ 
scenario, for example, people are liberated from having to live in the city and can 
escape to the rural idyll to live in an ʻelectronic cottageʼ 16.   MITʼs cyber-guru, 
Nicolas Negroponte,  predicts that “the transmission of place itself will start to 
become possible” through new virtual reality and telecommunications technologies” 
17, so eviscerating the locational hold of ʻspecial placesʼ like cities. Anthony Pascal 
extends this prediction by suggesting that "with the passage of time [will come] 
spatial regularity; the urban system converges on, even if never quite attains, 
complete areal uniformity"18.  To Pascal, cities will therefore  'vanish' as their chief 
raison dʼêtre  -  face-to-face contact - is substituted by electronic networks and 
spaces. New rural societies will emerge, as people exercise their new freedom to 
locate in small, attractive settlements that are better suited to their needs.  “If cities 
did not exist”, write the Futurists,  Naisbitt and Aburdene, “it would not now be 
necessary to invent them.. truly global cities will not be the largest, they will be the 
smartest”. 19 Even  Marshall McLuhan  believed that the emergence of the 'global 
village' meant that the city "as a form of major dimensions must inevitably dissolve 
like  a fading shot in a movie" 20.  
However, it is now becoming very clear that, as Jean Gottmann  put it,  "it does not 
necessarily follow [from improvements in telecommunications] that the compact city 
has been made obsolete and that settlements will disperse throughout the 
countryside" 21.  Teleworking, for example,  is growing. But it is being adopted as a 
way of making work patterns around large cities  more flexible, rather  than as a way 
                                                           
15Gillespie, A. (1992), "Communications Technologies And The Future Of The City". 
In M. Breheny (Ed) Sustainable Development And Urban Form, Pion; London, 67-
77. 
16 Toffler (1980), op cit. 
17 Negroponte, N. (1995), Being Digital: The Road Map to the Information 
Superhighway, London: Hodder and Stoughton; 165. 
18  Pascal, A. (1987), 'The Vanishing City', Urban Studies, 24, 597-603. 
19  Naisbitt, J. and Aburdene, P. (1991), Megatrends 2000 - Ten Directions for the 
1990s, New York: Avon Books. 
20 McLuhan, H. (1964), Understanding Media- The Extension of Man, London; 
Sphere. p 366) 
21Gottmann, J.  (1990), Since Megalopolis: The Urban Writings of Jean Gottman, 
Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 
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of supporting some mass migration of full-time teleworkers to electronic cottages in 
remote locations22 .   
In fact, urbanisation across the world continues apace and is, if anything, 
accelerating  rather than slackening.  In all continents, the proportion of populations 
living in large, urban areas, is expected to rise between 1994 and 2025. Between 
these dates the proportion of the global  population living in urban areas is expected 
to move from 45% to 61% ; in Europe, from 73% to 83%; in Latin American, from 
74% to 85%; in Africa, from 34% to 54%; in North America, from 76 to 85%; and in 
the Pacific region, from 70% to 75% 23. As the UNʼs Habitat II congress 
demonstrates, the ʻmega citiesʼ of the South, in particular, are growing  extremely 
quickly.   
Against the prophets of urban dissolution, in fact, I would argue that globalisation 
and developments in telematics actually tend to compound  the many existing 
advantages of large metropoli.  The very specificity  of the urban has much to do, as 
ever, with the ways cities facilitate all sorts of communications and exchange, both 
telemediated and face-to-face. This view suggests that it is no accident that 
telecommunications use is growing at the same time  as the world becomes more 
dominated by ever-larger urban regions.  The urban dominance of 
telecommunications investment and use supports this idea. For 15% of the French 
population, the Paris area receives 80% of telecommunications investment. For 10% 
of Japanʼs population, Tokyo has 30% of Japanese computers, and, in fact, more 
telephones than in the whole of sub-Saharan Africa 24 . As with earlier generations 
of communications technologies, such as the telephone and telegraph, an intense 
concentration of telecommunications and computer networks helps to facilitate two 
things for the city.   
First, telematics merely intensify long-established processes where the ʻbitsʼ of cities 
and urban systems become woven together into fast-moving and integrated 
transactional systems, and divisions of labour, of greater and greater levels of 
complexity, over more remote distances. Here we can extend Gottmannʼs 
suggestions about the relationship between the telephone and urban complexity.  
“The telephone”, he wrote,  “provides, when needed, quasi-immediate verbal 
communication between all the interdependent units  at minimum  costs [...]. It would 
have been very difficult for all these complex and integrated networks [in cities]  to 
                                                           
22 Gillespie, A., Richardson, R., and Cornford, J. (1995), Review of Telework in 
Britain: Implications for Public Policy. Report to the UK Parliamentary Office of 
Science and Technology.  
23 Steele, J. (1996), “Growing good news in cities”, The Observer, 26 May, pp 19. 
24  Graham, S. and Marvin, S. (1996), Telecommunications and the City: Electronic 
Spaces, Urban Places, London: Routledge, pp 133. 
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work in unison without the telephone, which made possible the constant and efficient 
coordination of all the systems of the large modern city [...]. The telephone helped to 
make the city bigger, better, more exciting” 25 .   For telephone here, we could now  
begin to insert read  ʻtelephones and telematicsʼ.  
Whilst such trends donʼt herald the demise of large cities, they do often have clear 
implications for urban form. Through their support for ʻextended complexityʼ over 
world-wide systems of cities, advanced telematics linkages  tend to facilitate the 
development of ʻextended urban regionsʼ,  rather than  traditional compact cities. 
With their polycentric ʻconstellationsʼ of centres, distributed across large areas,  such 
urban regions are becoming the norm.    
Second, telematics help to extend the dominance of urban services into more distant 
hinterlands. They  allow ʻaction at a distanceʼ and remote control from cities, allowing 
them to extend their domination over more and more distant places (smaller towns 
and rural areas). This is especially important given the intense uncertainties thrown 
up by the volatility, velocity and unpredictabilities of the global economy. In this 
situation the cities which head the global, urban hierarchy, become ever-more 
important as key nodes for reducing risks, managing uncertainties, and coordinating 
financial, investment and media flows, and institutional negotiations.  Such cities  
become, in effect, centres for the production of scarce knowledge and volatile 
information services. As Jean Gottmann suggests, “in the modern world, with its 
expanding and multiplying networks of relations and a snowballing mass of bits of 
information produced and exchanged along these [communications] networks, the 
information services are fast becoming an essential component, indeed a 
cornerstone, of transactional decision making and of urban centrality” 26 . At the top 
of the global urban hierarchy, cities like London, Tokyo and New York are as 
dominant than ever as global centres for global financial markets, high-level 
corporate head office functions and high level producer services (even though these 
sectors are ʻdown sizingʼ through new technology and using less office space). As 
Michelson and Wheeler argue, “in times of great uncertainty, select cities acquire 
strategic importance as command centres and as centralized producers of the 
highest order economic information 27. 
                                                           
25 Gottmann, J.  (1977), Megalopolis and antipolis: The telephone and the structure 
of the city”. In I. de Sola Pool (ed), The Social Impact of the Telephone, Cambridge 
Ma: MIT Press; 303-317; 312. 
26 Gottmann, (1990) ; 197. 
27Mitchelson, R.  and Wheeler, J. (1994), 'The flow of information in a global 
economy: the role of the American urban system in 1990', Annals of the Association 
of American Geographers, 84(1), 87-107.  
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Evidence also suggests that telematics may also be used to deliver routine services 
from large cities.  A recent survey in  USA  found that large city-regions were 
benefiting as service organisations like banks and insurance companies use 
telecommunications to deliver  consumer services to wider hinterlands, so reducing 
their branch networks in smaller towns and rural areas28.  
Clearly, then, we need to move beyond the dangerously simplistic  concepts which 
continue to feed the myth of urban dissolution. Fundamentally, cities and 
telecommunications  tend to stand in a state of recursive interaction,  shaping each 
other  in complex and diverse ways. As the quote from Pool showed above, these 
complex, contingent relations have a history running back to the days of the origin of 
the telegraph and telephone (and as the continued urban dominance of 
telecommunications investment and use makes clear).  Major urban places support 
dense webs of ʻco-presenceʼ, transactional opportunities, agglomeration economies,  
and access to labour, services, infrastructure and ʻsoftʼ cultural and social 
advantages. We should also not forget the roles of large cities as hubs within global 
migration flows, their functions as centres of governance and administration, their 
dominance in global media and cultural industries, their pivotal role as centres of 
booming industries for global tourism and conferences and exhibitions, and their key 
role as centres for innovation in manufacturing. These cannot - and will not - be 
mediated by telecommunications. This is because they are vital supports to high 
level  business activities in a risky and volatile global economy ; because the new 
urban culture relies on them ; and because face-to-face social and business life still 
derives from them. Cities are the key arenas that bring together  and ʻgroundʼ the 
increasingly globalised dynamics of economic, social, cultural and institutional life 
within specific places. Advances in telecommunications merely help further this 
process of urban development, both by supporting new levels of complexity in 
linkages, but also by allowing cities to further extend their reach into hinterlands and 
global markets. 
The Myth of Universal Access 
The third myth is that social access to new telecommunications technologies and 
services will somehow diffuse to be truly universal and equal. Many speculations of  
'futurists'  about telecommunications and cities generally  tend to take a relatively 
optimistic view of the future 'impacts' of telecommunications on cities and urban life. 
Often, these commentaries are breathless and excited, offering tantalising future 
glimpses of how  remarkable advances in new technologies will determine future 
lifestyles that are incalculably 'better' than those today.  Almost always,  this future 
                                                           
28 Office of Technological Assessment (1995), The Technological Reshaping of 
Metropolitan America, Washington: Office of Congress. 
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state  is offered as a scenario where, as Eubanks believes, "potentially huge benefits 
are to be had by all" 29 .  Jacques Maisonrouge, for example, argues that "modern 
information processing capability creates a society where everyone has an equal 
opportunity to be information literate [...] telecommunications and the computer are 
making information accessible to everyone"30 .   Santucci, an officer with the 
European Commission,  predicts that a "truly planetary consciousness will spring 
from the establishment, at world level, of bidirectional information highways 
accessible to all individuals" 31. Electronic democracy, ubiquitous access to 
information, overcoming discrimination, disability and frailty are some of  the 
common predictions that have also entered into recent discourse about cyberspace. 
Of course, once again, many telecommunications and computing corporations spend 
vast sums generating such benign and glossy images for their products, as part of 
the developing ideology of the information age 32 Many  academic debates about 
globalisation and the shift towards telematics-based social networks similarly seem 
to  imply some degree of  uniformity  in these processes. Universal access to 
technology is often assumed or implied. As Doreen Massey argues, even in many 
critical debates, the much-vaunted concept of ʻtime-space compressionʼ which tends 
to be invoked in these debates tends to be “a concept without much social 
content”33 . 
Current evidence suggests, however, that such predictions fly in the face of  
contemporary urban reality.  As  Pedersen  argued, there are dangers that what he 
calls the “radical democratic ideal of an information society” popularised by the 
utopian visions “may turn out to be a myth” 34.Urban societies seem to be becoming 
more  unequal not less  unequal, at the intra-urban, inter-urban and international 
scales. To a large proportion of the population of western, let alone Third World, 
                                                           
29 Eubanks, G. (1994), “Moving towards a networked society, Business and 
Technology Magazine, March, p42. 
30 Maisonrouge, J.  (1984), "Putting Information To Work For People", Intermedia, 
12(2), 31-33. 
31 Santucci,  G. (1994), 'Information Highways Worldwide: Challenges And 
Strategies', I&T Magazine, Spring, 614-23.; p16). 
32 Slack, J. (1987), 'The information age as Ideology: an introduction', In J. Slack 
And F. Fejes  (Eds) (1987)The Ideology Of The Information Age, Ibex, Norwood, 
New Jersey, 1-12. 
33  Massey, D. (1993), "Power-Geometry And A Progressive Sense Of Place" in J. 
Bird, B. Curtis, T. Putnam, G. Robertson, And L. Tickner  (1993), Mapping The 
Futures: Local Cultures, Global Change, London: Routledge. 59-69, p 59) 
34 Pedersen, F.  (1982), 'Power and participation in an information society: 
perspectives', in K. Grewlich and F. Pedersen (eds.), Power and Participation in an 
Information Society, Brussels: European Commission, 249-289; p 254) 
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cities, debates about linking homes to the Internet  or the “information superhighwayʼ 
are about as relevant as science fiction, given the rudimentary arithmetic jostling 
demands for food, clothing and heating.   
Inequalities  in  all of the requisites for being ʻon lineʼ are  profound, pervasive and 
possibly  growing : physical access to  to communications and electricity 
infrastructure, funds to pay connection and use charges ;  ability to pay for 
computers, modems and service charges ; and literacy, skills and training to make 
use of services 35. These inequalities are important because they influence the 
ability of people to participate in any meaningful fashion within increasingly 
information-based societies.  But they are also important because (usually male) 
social elites, who have the best access to networks, are able to use them to 
reinforce  their social privileges and, in many cases, their domination over those  
denied access to telecommunications and information of all descriptions.  Benign 
images for technology  tend to ignore the fact that access for some groups to these 
networks  and the services on them to them are an increasingly important means 
whereby power is exercised over space, time and people. As Eric Swyngedouw 
argues, “the increased  liberation and freedom from place as a result of new mobility 
modes for some may lead to the disempowerment and relative exclusion of others. 
This, in  turn, further accentuates economic and social inequalities” 36 .  
In general it is becoming clear that  those social groups with access to sophisticated 
telematics can often now begin to transcend  the physical limits and rhythms 
associated with  traditional urban life. Services, amenities and jobs can increasingly 
be accessed in electronic  space without  (necessarily)  moving in physical space 
(through teleworking, teleshopping, telebanking etc).  What Hägerstrand called the 
'time-space choreography' of every day life is no longer confined to urban physical 
spaces37 . For many (usually those with high physical mobility), it also encompasses 
the use of a multitude of electronic networks and spaces as phones, faxes  and 
electronic mail are used to keep in touch, distant computers support the petty 
transactions of everyday life, and the mass  media themselves begin to take the form 
of global electronic networks.   
                                                           
35  Massey, D. (1993), "Power-geometry and a progressive sense of place" in J. Bird, 
B. Curtis, T. Putnam, G. Robertson, And L. Tickner  (1993), Mapping The Futures: 
Local Cultures, Global Change, London: Routledge. 59-69.; 60). 
36Swyngedouw,  E. (1993), 'Communication, mobility and the struggle for power over 
space', in  in Giannopoulos, G.  And Gillespie, A. (1993) Transport And 
Communications In The New Europe, Belhaven: London., 305-325; pp 322. 
37 Hagerstrand, , T. (1970), "What about people in regional science ?', Papers, 
Regional Science Association, 24, 7-21. 
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There is some evidence that this intense, technology-based contact can allow  the 
connected homes  of affluent elites to become more disembedded  from their 
immediate social environment within urban places.  In some US cities (such as LA), 
it seems that public space where a range of different social groups interact is being 
lost. Replacing such spaces are secure, privatised consumer spaces (malls), a 
growth of electronic communications from fortified homes (in secure enclaves 
communities) and, of course, the private car as the (increasingly fortified) transporter 
between work, home and the mall 38.  Manuel Castells, for example,   argues that 
“homes [...] are becoming equipped with a self-sufficient world of images, sounds, 
news, and information exchanges [...]. Homes could  become disassociated from 
neighbourhoods and cities and still not be lonely, isolated places.  They would be 
populated by voices, by images, by sounds, by ideas, by games, by colors, by news” 
39. Such trends towards ʻcocooningʼ are  being encouraged  by growing fear of crime 
and incursion, and by the proliferation of master-planned, gated communities, such 
as those now common in the USA 40.  
These trends offer some disturbing  hints of the way telematics may be used to 
support  ever-greater social fragmentation and polarisation within  cities. Whilst 
intense physical and electronic security closes off  such ʻurban enclavesʼ from the 
wider world,  ever-more capable, Ethernet-style connections are being planned into 
the basic infrastructure of these master-planned communities. The result can be a 
urban landscape of profound fragmentation, where new technologies become 
enmeshed in the production of a new, ʻcellularʼ urban structures, based on 
preventing contact between affluent elites and those deemed not to ʻbelongʼ in their 
spaces. 
Of course,  the story is very different for those who remain spatially trapped in the 
urban ghettos and who have very little, if any, access to the electronic spaces 
accessible via telematics networks.  As Michael Dear suggests, with telematics,  
“time-space coordinates have been stretched to as yet unknown dimensions”   for 
highly-mobile, elite groups whilst at the same time “for minorities, the poor, the 
disabled, and women, the time-space prism closes rapidly to become a time-space 
ʻprisonʼ” 41 . The boundaries between these different social areas in cities can now 
                                                           
38 Sorkin, M. (Ed), (1992) Variations On A Theme Park: The New American City and 
the End of Public Space, New York; Hill And Wang. 
39 Castells, M. (1985), "High technology, economic restructuring and the urban-
regional process in the United States". In Castells, M. (Ed) High Technology, Space 
And Society. Sage: London, 11-39. 
40 Dillon, D. (1994), 'Fortress America',  Planning, June, 8-12. 
41 Dear, M.  (1993), "In the city, time becomes visible: land use planning and the 
emergent postmodern urbanism". Mimeo, pp 27. 
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be considered to be social edges  both in physical and also electronic spaces. With 
telecommunication increasingly developing according to the logic of liberalised 
markets, wide social imbalances in access to networks and the services which run 
on  them are an intrinsic part of their current development. Whilst some see 
telecommunications to be "technologies of freedom" 42, I would argue that they tend 
to offer freedom only to already powerful social groups. 
But the varied ways in which telecommunications are socially structured means that 
these inequalities and differences are also complex, and do not  derive entirely from 
the unevenness of global economic networks and uneven wealth. Relationships 
between access, the degree to which people use telecommunications, and power 
are complex. On the one hand, for example, many workers in the information back 
offices in nations like the Phillipines, Jamaica and India actually communicate a 
great deal but have little or no power as a result 43. Their jobs remain as low wage,  
risky to health and under military-level discipline levels.  On the other hand, even 
one low-bandwidth connection to the Internet can now make a significant difference 
to activist groups and popular demonstrations, in placing issues onto the global 
media agenda, as the recent experience  of the Chiapas rebels and the student 
demonstrators in Tiananmen Square makes clear. 
The Myth of Simple Substitution of Transport by Telecommunications 
 
A fourth myth pervades many futuristic and deterministic writings on cities: the 
assumption that telecommunications offer clean,  demateralised   solutions that  will  
offer simple substitutions for the material ills  of commuting and pollution in physical 
spaces. Telematics networking has even been called the "alternative fuel". In this 
vein, James Martin, in his prediction of the oncoming 'Wired Society', suggested that 
the congested and polluted physical spaces of cities would in the future be overcome 
by the growth  of 'virtual cities', based on the use of telecommunications to replace 
physical transport and the need for propinquity 44 .  
In reality, however, transport and telecommunications flows tend to grow together, to 
be mutually reinforcing. There are three aspects of this co-evolution. First,  it has 
long been recognised that, as well as substituting for travel, telecommunications can 
actually generate or induce  many new demands for physical movement. Electronic 
flows are able to act as powerful generators or inducers of movement in both 
physical flows and spaces. Telecommunications networks can help increase a 
personʼs or firmʼs conceptual  or information  spaces. Mokhtarian argues that by 
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"making information about outside activities and interaction opportunities more 
readily accessible, telecommunications creates the desire to participate in those 
activities and opportunities, thereby stimulating travel to engage in them"45 . As e-
mail, fax and  telephone effectively increases the number of participants in business 
or recreation networks, this can then create demands for higher-level and longer-
distance forms of interaction between the participants in the network based on 
interpersonal interaction. This creates a demand for physical co-presence leading to 
new forms of physical travel that might have not taken place without the 
telecommunications linkage. The development of cheaper and faster train, 
automobile and airline networks allows this inter-urban travel to occur.  
Second, substitution of travel by teleworking, teleshopping etc is never a simple 
process. The concept of a more  or less constant personal travel time budget means 
that "the natural result of reducing some travel by  telecommunications, is that 
additional travel is likely to be created to compensate - to fulfil the travel time budget" 
46. Here, telecommunications does not necessarily stimulate travel but by reducing 
travel, it creates time for increased travel for other purposes. Telecommuters, for 
example, may travel further total distances than before, because of longer leisure, 
social and shopping trips during the working day. These conclusions are supported 
by long-run analyses of the relationship between telecommunications and travel.   
Third, telecommunications also contribute towards the enhancement of 
transportation networks by increasing the efficiency, safety and attractiveness of 
different transport modes.  Throughout history "transportation has always been in the 
vanguard of new communications applications, because control messages must 
exceed the speed of the transport itself for effective adjustment to delays, crises and 
accidents"47 . Transportation in all its forms is controlled by telephone and data lines 
to dispatch and control traffic. Improvements in these control systems have 
important implications for increasing the capacity, effectiveness, safety and reducing 
the cost of transportation networks. 
The new control, supervision, and data acquisition role of telecommunications can 
increase the attractiveness of travel48  For instance, new computerised systems for 
booking and payment of travel make it very easy to obtain information and pay for air 
travel. In turn, more effective methods of managing travel networks can help 
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increase the efficiency of transport networks at all levels - road, rail, air travel - so 
lowering costs and increasing the attractiveness of travel as an option. It has 
become increasingly clear that the new technologies of road transport informatics 
provides ways of overcoming the problems of congested road networks and 
increasing the effective capacity of these networks at a fraction of the cost of 
constructing entirely new transport infrastructure 49.  
 
The Myth of Local Powerlessness  
 
The final myth is that, in the general  ʻshockʼ, ʻwaveʼ or ʻrevolutionʼ models through 
which telecommunications are seen to have ʻimpactsʼ  on cities, there is very little   
power at the local level to alter the apparent ʻdestinyʼ of technologyʼs driving force.  
The stress on autonomous technology, positive scenarios, and future cities, 
suggests that analytical and policy debates centre around how society can  adapt to  
and learn to live with  the effects  of telecommunications-based change, rather than 
focusing on the ways in which these effects may be altered or reshaped through 
policy initiatives.  Implicitly, local social and political actors in contemporary cities 
have little or no scope to shape telecommunications developments within cities.  As 
Robert Warren argues, "benign projections give little indication that there are 
significant policy issues which should be on the public agenda" 50 .   
 
In fact, though, there is currently a world-wide upsurge of urban attempts to use  
telecommunications as policy tools for economic, social and cultural development51.   
Telematics have become a natural policy focus as policy makers everywhere have 
struggled to reinvigorate city economies, physically regenerate urban areas, market 
urban spaces as global sites for investment, address social polarisation,  and 
restructure public services to address funding crises.  
 
Such policies are leading to wide variations in the ways in which telecommunications 
are socially shaped in different cities. Four areas where telematics and 
telecommunications have emerged as key policy foci can be highlighted First,  cities 
have attempted to develop  ʻteleportsʼ such as the New York teleport. Such initiatives 
blend state of the art satellite and optic fibre networks and are aimed  to position 
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cities as global sites for investment and telecommunications competition for 
multinational service and manufacturing corporations.  Roubaix, in France, has 
based its entire urban regeneration strategy on a teleport aimed at putting it “on the 
networks of the future”. Second, cities have developed host computer systems, 
ʻFreenetʼ civic networks, and over two thousand so-called ʻvirtual citiesʼ, like the 
Amsterdam Digital City, based on the Internet52 . These are aimed at boosting the 
ʻendogenousʼ development  of cities, by using telematics to try and ʻreconnectʼ the 
economic, social and cultural fragments that increasingly characterise contemporary 
cities. Third, many cities are developing innovative programmes through which 
public services are delivered via  telecommunications53 . Finally, cities are 
attempting to collaborate across regions, nations and continents, through developing 
computer communications networks like the ʻTelecitiesʼ network in Europe. These 
are  aimed at supporting exchanges of information and ʻbest practiceʼ and 
coordinating lobbying.  
 
Conclusions: Electronic Spaces, Urban Places 
 
Debates about cities and telecommunications have an unfortunate tendency  to base 
themselves - usually implicitly - on simplistic and unjustified assumptions. Too often, 
these ʻsediment outʼ into widely accepted myths and orthodoxies, which have 
severely restricted progress in understanding how cities and telecommunications 
genuinely interact.  The result is that, whilst it seems clear that the current  growth of 
electronic-based exchanges is inevitably going to be a key aspect of future urban 
development, we remain in a  very poor position to analyse exactly how these these 
exchanges and urban change are likely to relate to each other.  
 
I would argue that the above myths need to be discarded ; that  more sophisticated 
perspectives need to be established. I suggest three starting points for such 
perspectives. First, they needs to accept that society and technology shape each 
other  in complex ways. Theoretical models which conceptualise the ʻsocialʼ and 
ʻtechnologicalʼ to be caught up in complex and recursive interactions, rather than in 
separate realms, are required 54. Second, they must acknowledge  that what 
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concentration in urban regions,  flow by physical transport and face-to-face ʻco-
presenceʼ offer cannot be simply telemediated, to be substituted by more advanced 
telecommunications.  In fact,  transportation and telecommunications flows and face-
to-face urban life and electronic exchange tend to feed off each other in  positive 
feedback loops.  finally, such  perspectives should recognise that advanced 
telecommunications networks are  being used as systems through which  power is 
being exercised, largely  by large corporations and affluent elites over space, time 
and socially-powerless groups55 .  
 
Above all,  there is a need to  begin viewing  the contemporary city  as  an amalgam  
whereby the fixed, tangible and visible aspects of  life in urban places interact 
continuously with the intangible, electronically-mediated transactions, operating 
across wider and wider scales.  Fixed  constructions of urban places, and buildings 
in urban places, linked into electronic networks and ʻspacesʼ, seem to be  the 
defining constructions of contemporary urbanism.  Telematics - the supports for 
electronic  spaces - are increasingly being woven  intimately into the built 
environments of cities ; they are also filling the corridors between them as key 
infrastructures underpinning the shift to global urban and infrastructural networks. 
Together, the diverse ʻelectronic spacesʼ  amount to a hidden and  parallel universe 
of buzzing electronic networks. Relatively free from space and time constraints,  
these interact with and impinge on the tangible and familiar dynamics of urban life on  
a 24 hours-a-day basis and at all geographical scales.   This shadowy world of 
electronic spaces exists through the instantaneous flows of electrons and photons 
within cities and across  planetary metropolitan networks.  These flows underpin  
virtually all that we see and experience as we approach our daily lives, yet, as we 
have seen, few have much awareness of them. 
 
But these new technologies donʼt support some simple shift to a telemediated 
economy, society and culture. Rather, a complex articulation  between life in urban 
places and interaction in electronic spaces seems to be emerging. “Constructed 
spaces”, writes William Mitchell,  “will increasingly be seen as electronically-serviced 
sites where bits meet the body -- where digital information is translated into visual, 
auditory, tactile or otherwise sensorily perceptible form, and vice versa. Displays and 
sensors for presenting and capturing information will be as essential as doors” 56 .  
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As Kevin Robins suggests, “through the development of new technologies, we are, 
indeed, more and more open to experiences of de-realization and de-localization. 
But we continue to have physical and localized existences. We must consider our 
state of suspension between these conditions” .  In other words, the contemporary 
city, while housing vast arrays of telematic ʻentry pointsʼ into the burgeoning worlds 
of electronic spaces, is still a  meaningful   place economically, socially and 
culturally. This is especially so when one remembers that access to new telematics 
technologies tends to be the almost exclusive preserve of  powerful firms, 
organisations and  social (usually male) elites, and that spatial inequalities at all 
levels in such access remain extremely stark. 
 
It is worth illustrating some examples of this ʻstate of suspensionʼ between face-to-
face urban life and electronically-mediated interaction.  Thus a car, rail, plane or bus 
journey, and the physical flows of water, commodities. manufactured goods and 
energy are supported by a  parallel electronic ʻnetworldʼ. These monitor, shape and 
controls the physical flows underway on a ʻreal timeʼ basis.  Traffic snarl ups are now 
the launch pads for countless electronic conversations and interactions. The 
development of electronic financial markets now  links the centres of global finance 
capitals across the world  in ʻreal timeʼ. The apparently lifeless world of an office 
block  in, say, the City of London, often now hides an ʻintelligent buildingʼ - a hub in 
an electronic universe of 24 hour-a-day global flows of capital, services and labour 
power.   One single office block in Wall Street now operates as a node in daily 
electronic transactions estimated at $2 trillion 57. ʻBack officeʼ networks  are 
developing though which  routine services such as data processing and insurance 
processing are delivered  from the periphery - often cities  in Third World nations - to 
the centres of large cities like London and New York.  
 
Global media flows like satellite TV are exploding, linking  cities into a single, 
integrated global cultural system.  The  daily life of an urban resident  leaves a 
continuous set of ʻdigital imagesʼ as it is mapped out by a  wide array of surveillance 
systems - closed circuit TV cameras, electronic transactions systems, road transport 
informatics and the like.  The fortressing of affluent neighbourhoods relies on plain 
old walls and gates linked into sophisticated electronic surveillance systems (as well 
as phone, cable and telematics networks that allow ʻfortressedʼ home life to link to 
the world). The most ordinary suburbs of most cities now act as  a hub in the 
growing electronic cacophony of  global image and media  flows  and the on-going 
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participation of people in virtual communities, often on a global basis. Global 
ʻcommunities of interestʼ and place based communities become linked together, but 
in ways we are only now beginning to explore.   And urban policies and strategies 
are increasingly directed to try and shape both urban places and electronic spaces.  
 
These examples show that the shadowy  world of electronic spaces is as diverse 
and complex as the landscapes and life of cities themselves. This contrasts with the 
implication in many popular debates that ʻcyberspaceʼ is somehow a  integrated 
whole -  a single, globally-interconnected, and universally-accessible electronic 
space. Far from it. In fact, the fundamental purpose of corporate, elite, military, 
finance and surveillance networks is to be secure, proprietary  and disconnected 
from  non-authorised users.  Software ʻfirewallsʼ separate corporate intranets based 
on Internet technology from the wider ʻpublic Internetʼ ; even this is being rapidly 
tuned into a corporately-dominated electronic domain for pay-per services. As with 
the geographical landscapes of cities, then, ʻcyberspaceʼ has many segmentations, 
many social divisions and many social struggles underway.  There are ʻinformation 
black holesʼ and ʻelectronic ghettosʼ where the poor remain confined to the traditional 
marginalised life of the physically confined, and  there are intense concentrations of 
infrastructure  in city centres and elite suburbs supporting the corporate classes and 
Transnational Corporations. And, as with geographical landscapes, the results can 
be ʻreadʼ as reflections of complex processes whereby social, ethnic, gender and 
power relations play out against the back drop of the globalising political economy of 
capitalism.  
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